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Editorial note
Donald H Regan*
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, FEDERAL STATES, AND SOV-
EREIGNTY: SOME RANDOM REMARKS
I am not an EU lawyer. The days are long gone when I could know a 
substantial fraction of EU law just by knowing about the free movement 
of goods. I get a fleeting glimpse of where the EU is going every year at 
the Jean Monnet Seminar in Dubrovnik, but no more than a glimpse. 
Still, when the editors invited me to write this Editorial Note, I could not 
refuse. Looking for inspiration, I read or reread all the previous twelve 
Notes. This was an enjoyable and informative exercise in itself, but only 
a few of the essays suggested topics I might have anything to say about. 
There were a few, however. And so, without claiming to advance discus-
sion within the EU in any way, I will venture a few idle remarks on how 
some of that discussion struck this outsider. Specifically, I want to jux-
tapose some suggestions and assertions made in those Notes about the 
EU with some observations about the US and (just at the end) Canada.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and ‘incorporation’
Both Judge Koen Lenaerts’ editorial note1 and (now Judge) Siniša 
Rodin and Tamara Ćapeta’s note2 raise the issue of whether the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights should be regarded as applicable to the actions 
of Member States beyond what is specified in article 51, which says the 
Charter is addressed to the EU institutions and to the Member States 
‘only when they are implementing Union law’. Lenaerts argues against 
any broader application. But as Rodin and Ćapeta point out, Advocate 
General Eleanor Sharpston suggested, in her opinion in Zambrano, that 
the Charter should be applicable to Member States (not in Zambrano it-
self, but ‘sooner rather than later’) whenever they are exercising a com-
petence shared with the Union, even in the absence of Union legislation.3 
Indeed, at one point Sharpston could be read to suggest that in future the 
Charter might be applied ‘independently of any other link with Union law’, 
*  William W Bishop, Jr, Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I 
am very grateful to the people who read a draft for me, but I shall not name them, to avoid 
even the slightest chance that my errors about EU law might be charged to them.
1 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Linking EU Citizenship to Democracy’ (2015) 11 CYELP vii.
2 Siniša Rodin and Tamara Ćapeta, ‘European Integration and Disintegration’ (2010) 6 
CYELP.
3 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2010:560, 
Opinion of AG Sharpston. The quoted words are from para 177.
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which could cover all actions of the Member States, without any limit.  She 
writes, ‘I therefore conclude, . . . , that, at the time of the relevant facts, 
the fundamental right to family life under EU law could not be invoked as 
a free-standing right, independently of any other link with EU law, . . .’.4 
But we can also understand this sentence as merely repeating the sugges-
tion of application in areas of shared competence, while emphasizing that 
there need be no link to Union law other than the unexercised overlapping 
Union competence.
All of these authors, despite their divergent views about the desir-
ability of such an expansion of the Charter, analogize it to the process 
of ‘incorporation’ by which the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution was 
made applicable against the states (applicable in most respects – a quali-
fication I will not repeat hereafter). Which led me to reflect on some dif-
ferences. The most obvious difference is that the Bill of Rights has been 
incorporated into another specific provision of the Constitution (the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) that is specifically aimed 
at the states and that was motivated by distrust of the (southern) states’ 
motives vis-à-vis some of their own citizens (the newly freed slaves and, 
to a lesser extent, Unionist whites). So far as I am aware, neither feature 
is present in the EU. There is no suggestion that the Charter can be read 
into some other provision that is specifically aimed at the Member States; 
and there is no rights-creating provision that is specifically motivated by 
distrust of the Member States in their treatment of their own nationals. 
It might be argued that the decision in the Lisbon Treaty to make the 
Charter binding was partly motivated by such distrust with regard to the 
newer Member States. But the Charter as written is still squarely focused 
on the EU institutions, with some uncertain extension to Member State 
actions under the EU umbrella.
The one specific bit of EU primary law that I know has been sug-
gested as a vehicle for incorporation is article 20 TFEU, on EU citizen-
ship. I have no view about the plausibility of that suggestion from the EU 
lawyer’s point of view, but it does prompt a comparison of article 20 with 
a part of the Fourteenth Amendment that we have not mentioned yet, the 
citizenship clause. The very first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment 
reads as follows: ‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside’. The point of this clause was not to 
create US citizenship, which was already referred to a number of times 
(although not defined) in the 1787 Constitution. The point was to unam-
biguously extend US citizenship to the newly freed slaves (a status which 
4 ibid, para 176.
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the Supreme Court had denied them in the recent Dred Scott decision),5 
and also to guarantee that the freedmen would be state citizens as well, 
by taking away from the states control of their own citizenship. This aspect 
of the citizenship clause is motivated by suspicion of (some) states, just 
like the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consider next that the theory which was relied on to justify incorpo-
ration in the US context justified a good deal more than just incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. For a start, we have 
two due process clauses. There is the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which by its terms binds the states. There is also a 
due process clause in the Fifth Amendment (part of the Bill of Rights), 
which binds the federal government. I shall not pause over the oddity 
of finding implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, such as freedom of speech or even jury trial, that stand out-
side the (essentially identically worded) due process clause in the Bill of 
Rights. It is one of those oddities American lawyers have got used to. But 
just as we have incorporated the Bill of Rights, originally binding only on 
the federal government, into a provision that binds the states (Fourteenth 
Amendment due process), so we have made the equal protection clause, 
which was originally binding only on the states (and for which there is no 
explicit analogue applicable to the federal government), binding on the 
federal government by reading it into the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, a process we refer to as ‘reverse incorporation’. This ‘reverse 
incorporation’ may seem analogous to the process by which, before the 
adoption of the Charter, the EU institutions were held to be bound by 
certain general principles protecting rights that were common to many 
Member State constitutions. But the analogy is imperfect. In the US, the 
principle that is expanded from addressing only the states to addressing 
the federal government is not a principle rooted in the state constitutions. 
It is a principle first enunciated in the federal constitution, but only ad-
dressed to the states. 
Next, although we talk about ‘incorporation’ of the Bill of Rights into 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, formal incorporation has 
never been the official theory of the Court.  The official theory has always 
been that certain protections found in the Bill of Rights are ‘essential to 
ordered liberty’, or are ‘deeply rooted in our legal traditions’. It is only 
because this is the theory that it was possible for the process of incorpo-
ration to have started in 1897 with the prohibition in the Fifth Amend-
ment on uncompensated takings6 and to be still ongoing in 2010, with 
5 Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
6 Chicago Burlington and Quincy RR v City of Chicago 166 US 226 (1897).
Xthe incorporation of the Second Amendment right to bear arms.7 And it 
is only because this is the theory that it has been possible for incorpo-
ration to be incomplete. There are a few provisions of the Bill of Rights 
that people generally assume would apply to the states, but that have 
not been officially incorporated (at least by the Supreme Court), because 
the issue has never been presented. But more importantly, there are two 
provisions that have been held not to apply to the states, the indictment 
requirement in the Fifth Amendment and the civil jury requirement in 
the Seventh Amendment.  Whether proponents of incorporation of the EU 
Charter favor such ‘selective incorporation’ or complete incorporation, I 
do not know.  It seems that which kind of incorporation we have ought to 
depend on the reason for incorporation, or the theoretical justification for 
it.  But I do not know what the reasons or theory would be in the EU for 
expanding the reach of the Charter beyond the literal terms of article 51. 
The American theory of ‘incorporation’ that I have described – justi-
fying incorporation in terms of rights ‘essential to ordered liberty’ or the 
like – is the same theory that has allowed the highly controversial judi-
cial discovery of ‘unenumerated rights’ like the right to abortion under 
the doctrine of ‘substantive due process’. When the Court read the free 
speech guarantee of the First Amendment into the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, that was essentially an exercise in substan-
tive due process. The free speech right was ‘enumerated’, to be sure, but 
not as applied to the states. Do EU lawyers who argue for ‘incorporation’ 
of the Charter mean to sign up for the possibility that the ECJ will create 
an EU version of substantive due process? 
I have not undertaken research to see what theories have been sug-
gested for ‘incorporation’ of the Charter. Of course, what sort of theory 
we need depends on just what we are trying to justify. Are we trying to 
justify article 51 itself, which makes the Charter applicable to the Mem-
ber States (only) when they are implementing EU law? (Even this ought 
to have some justification or explanation. I assume the standard justi-
fication is consistency in EU law, at least in areas where the EU legisla-
ture has thought it important to exercise its powers.) Or are we trying to 
justify Sharpston’s suggestion that the Charter should apply to Member 
States whenever they are exercising a competence shared with the EU, 
even in the absence of EU legislation? Or are we trying to justify the even 
broader possibility that the Charter should apply to all Member State ac-
tions, without limitation? To raise some general points, let me posit just 
one possible argument, which might be offered to justify the broadest of 
these possibilities.
7 McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010).
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We might argue that the Charter represents European Union values, 
and that Union values ought to be reflected in, and ought to constrain, 
anything a Member State of the Union does. (I cannot resist suggesting 
that if EU citizenship is ‘destined to be the fundamental status of nation-
als of the Member States’,8 that might arguably entail the even more radi-
cal idea that EU membership is destined to be the fundamental status of 
the Member States themselves – a claim one might very plausibly make 
about the states of the US.) But this argument, as it stands, does not 
address the crucial question of why we should make the Charter bind-
ing on Member States, with the understanding that it then becomes the 
courts’ job, and the Court’s, to oversee the Member States in this respect. 
For that matter, why was the Charter made binding on the EU institu-
tions themselves? In the case of the American Bill of Rights, the answer 
is clear. The Bill of Rights was adopted to quiet Anti-Federalist fears of a 
tyrannical central government. And although we now think of the Bill of 
Rights mainly as protecting individual rights, it was originally intended 
to protect the states against the federal government quite as much as 
to protect the citizens. Furthermore, although the Bill of Rights techni-
cally took the form of amendments to the original 1787 Constitution, it 
was essentially part of a single contemporaneous package, since it was 
promised by the Federalists to the Anti-Federalists during the ratification 
debates. None of this is true of the Charter. There may be Brexiteers and 
other extreme euro-sceptics who would describe the EU as ‘tyrannical’, 
but no one is afraid that the EU will suppress political speech critical of 
it, or establish a church, or disarm the Member State militaries, or use an 
unconstrained police and judicial system to destroy opposition.  
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in response to 
a real and present threat, this time from the states. It was adopted to 
protect vulnerable citizens of the states against the states themselves. As 
with the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment was not adopted just 
out of a general commitment to the values it enshrines, in a moment of 
political calm that provided an opportunity for a reflective statement of 
the nation’s commitments. It was adopted at a time of political turmoil, 
in response to a specific threat to the values that the victorious Union 
(the non-seceding states) had fought for; and it reflected the belief that 
only federal institutions, both courts and Congress, could be counted on 
to protect those values in large parts of the country. Much of the later 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment can 
also be understood as the Supreme Court’s response to what they saw as 
widespread, even systemic, threats from the states to various essential 
freedoms (to speech in the 1920s; to criminal justice in the 1950s and 
8 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para 31, and many later cases.
XII
1960s; perhaps even to the right to bear arms in 2010). Is the current 
situation in the EU analogous? 
Turning to a different aspect of rights protection (which I will eventu-
ally connect to a question about the Charter), an American lawyer cannot 
help but be struck by the ECJ’s willingness to find that primary EU law 
(in Defrenne9) and general principles of EU law (in Mangold10) create rights 
of action against private individuals. In US constitutional law, the equal 
protection clause creates no such rights (except in special cases where 
the private defendant is performing a ‘public function’ or is somehow 
actively supported by the state), because of the ‘state action’ doctrine. 
(Nor does any other part of the Constitution create rights against private 
individuals, with very minor exceptions.) There is of course a possibly 
significant difference in wording between the equal protection clause and 
article 119 TEEC, involved in Defrenne. The equal protection clause says, 
‘No state shall . . . [deny any person equal protection of the laws]’.  It is 
not inevitable, but it is perfectly natural, to interpret this as meaning 
(only) that the state itself shall not act unequally.  In contrast, article 119 
says, ‘Each Member State shall [during the first stage] ensure and sub-
sequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women 
should receive equal pay for equal work’. This could be read as saying 
only that the state itself shall not pay unequally. But because it talks 
about ‘ensuring the application’ of the principle of equal pay, it is no less 
natural, and perhaps more natural, to read this as requiring the state to 
forbid private discrimination. And then it is a fairly easy step, which the 
Court has taken, to say that in cases where it is clear what article 119 
requires the Member State to do, we should act as if the Member State 
had done it. Things may not be quite so straightforward in Mangold. As I 
understand it, the ‘general principles of EU law’ that the Court appealed 
to in Mangold are inferred from general international law, the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and Member State constitutions.  Has the 
Court ever asked whether those sources of the general principle on which 
they based a right of action against a private individual themselves create 
such rights? Should that matter? Can it not matter? And what if some of 
the sources do create such rights and some do not?
But now to my question, what is the effect of the Charter on all of this? 
Article 51 of the Charter says the provisions of the Charter are addressed 
to EU institutions, and to Member States in some limited contexts. There 
is no mention of it applying to private behavior. And if it binds Member 
States only in limited contexts, it seems that a fortiori it should not bind 
private behavior in general. But the Charter of course includes equality 
9 Case C-43/75 Defrenne v SABENA ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.
10 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.
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provisions.  Article 21 generally forbids discrimination on the basis of age 
or sex, inter alia; and article 23 specifically forbids sex discrimination in 
employment. Does the combination of the focus on government institu-
tions in article 51, and the equality provisions elsewhere in the Charter 
that are not explicit about who they are addressed to, suggest that the 
Charter does not create rights against private individuals and that, as lex 
specialis or lex posterior, it requires a retreat from Defrenne and Mangold? 
I doubt that many EU lawyers would be inclined to push this suggestion. 
The language of the equality provisions in the Charter could still support 
the Defrenne/Mangold logic. My point is only that it seems somewhat 
odd to this outsider that with a chance to endorse the approach of those 
cases, the drafters of the Charter failed to do so specifically, assuming 
they approved the approach.  Perhaps the idea of abstractly stated rights 
creating causes of action against private individuals is so well established 
in the general European mindset that no confirmation seemed necessary. 
But then why were Defrenne and (even more) Mangold controversial? 
Let us take a detour to consider a curiosity. Advocate General 
Sharpston’s suggestion that the Charter might apply to Member State ac-
tion in areas of shared competence, even when the EU legislature had not 
acted, put me in mind of an American case, Morgan v Virginia, decided in 
1946.11 In Morgan, decided before the Supreme Court’s watershed anti-
segregation decision in Brown v Board of Education (1954),12 the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional, as applied to interstate buses, a Virginia law 
that required racially segregated seating in buses. In regulating interstate 
buses, Virginia was exercising a competence that it shared with Con-
gress, the regulation of commerce. So my first thought was that Morgan 
might be analogous to Sharpston’s suggestion. But on reflection I real-
ized it is quite different. The fact that Virginia was exercising a compe-
tence it shared with the federal government was essential to the rationale 
of the case. But not because exercising the shared competence brought 
Virginia within the ambit of a prohibition on racial segregation that ap-
plied to the federal government. In 1946, there was no such prohibition. 
As noted earlier, the prohibition on segregation by the federal government 
was actually established in 1954 by ‘reverse incorporation’ of the newly 
established prohibition on segregation by the states.13 In Morgan, it was 
the federal commerce power itself that invalidated the Virginia law.  Reg-
ulation of interstate commerce is undoubtedly a shared competence; but 
the mere existence of the federal power, even if unexercised by Congress, 
is held to impose some limits on what the states can do with their power. 
The most important such limit is a ban on interstate protectionism. But 
11 328 US 373 (1946).
12 347 US 483 (1954).
13 Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954).
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another limit forbids excessive ‘burdens’ on interstate commerce, at least 
by state laws that regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
like the bus system.14 The Supreme Court’s complaint against the Vir-
ginia law in Morgan was that it slowed down interstate transport because 
it required the reseating of passengers when a bus entered Virginia from 
a non-segregating state. The most relevant precedent was a case decid-
ed the previous year invalidating an Arizona law that limited the length 
of trains, with the consequence that many interstate trains had to stop 
and be re-constituted at the Arizona state line.15 That Arizona case had 
nothing to do with race or with any individual right. So Morgan was a 
case where the protection of interstate commerce against economic harm 
could be enlisted to protect an individual right. (I believe this phenom-
enon is not unknown in the EU.) But it has nothing to do with expanding 
the application of any individual rights guarantee as such. 
For all that we academics criticize courts, we also tend to have an 
unreasonable faith in them. In the US, judicial review has probably been 
a good thing on balance, but it has not been an unmixed blessing. It 
would be easy to generate a long list of Supreme Court decisions that 
have invalidated desirable statutes, starting with Dred Scott v Sandford in 
1857 (invalidating the Missouri Compromise, which may not seem ‘desir-
able’, but which was better than what the Court left in place)16 and the 
Civil Rights Cases in 1883 (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875);17 
continuing through the Court’s resistance to the rise of the regulatory 
state, for example in Lochner v New York in 1905 (invalidating a New York 
maximum-hours law for bakery workers)18 and Hammer v Dagenhart in 
1918 (invalidating the first federal child labor law);19 right up through 
modern cases like District of Columbia v Heller in 2008 (invalidating cer-
tain gun laws),20 Citizens United v FEC in 2010 (invalidating certain cam-
paign finance restrictions),21 or Shelby County v Holder in 2013 (invali-
dating a crucial provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965),22 to name just 
a few. Of course, my list of unfortunate uses of judicial review reflects 
14 I argue that the doctrine forbidding excessive ‘burdens’ on commerce (by regulations, as 
opposed to taxation, for which there is a quite distinct test) is in fact limited to the protec-
tion of the instrumentalities of commerce. See DH Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State 
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law 
Review 1091.
15 Southern Pacific Co v Arizona, 325 US 761 (1945). 
16 See n 5.
17 109 US 3 (1883).
18 198 US 45.
19 247 US 251. 
20 554 US 570. 
21 558 US 310.
22 570 US 2.
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my political preferences, but anyone, whatever their political preferences, 
could produce their own long list. As to incorporation and reverse incor-
poration in particular, they magnify the effect of many individual deci-
sions, for good or ill (for example, extending Second Amendment limits on 
gun control to the states, and extending Equal Protection limits on racial 
affirmative action to the federal government). They also reduce the often 
reasonable, even desirable, variety of constitutional regimes. Arguably, 
incorporation is not something to wish for in the absence of a genuine 
need.
‘Sovereignty’ and federal states
The other topic that caught my eye as I read the previous Editorial 
Notes was the nature of the European Union. And I was struck especially 
by Steven Blockmans’ statement that the EU ‘cannot be regarded as a 
federal state, because it consists of a number of sovereign states’.23 I 
agree with Blockmans that the EU is not a federal state; and the various 
elements of sovereignty retained by the Member States are surely an im-
portant part of the reason. But the conceptual claim that the EU cannot 
be a federal state because it consists of sovereign Member States would 
come as a surprise to many current and former Justices of the US Su-
preme Court. I take it that the US is a federal state, perhaps a paradigm 
case. But the Supreme Court has referred to the states as sovereign in a 
number of recent decisions. Indeed, the explicit rationale of many recent 
cases turns precisely on claims about state sovereignty. State sovereign-
ty is the Supreme Court’s explanation for why Congress cannot require 
a state legislature to legislate in a way prescribed by Congress,24 and 
why Congress may not impose positive duties on state executive officers 
(except perhaps reporting data).25 State sovereignty is also the Supreme 
Court’s explanation for why an individual usually may not sue a state for 
money damages in a federal court, nor in a state court (under a federal 
statute) without the state’s consent.26 Of course, there are many critics 
who regard these decisions as wrong, and ‘state sovereignty’ as poppy-
cock. And there are still others who regard the decisions as right, and 
‘state sovereignty’ as poppycock. But for the present and the foreseeable 
future, the official, and consequential, doctrine of the Supreme Court is 
that the states are in some sense sovereign.
23 Steven Blockmans, ‘Is It a Bird? Is It a Plane? It’s the European Union! The German 
Constitutional Court’s Lissabon-Urteil’ (2009) 5 CYELP vii, xix.
24 New York v US 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
25 Printz v US 521 US 898 (1997).
26 Eg, Seminole Tribe v Florida 517 US 44 (1996).
XVI
If we take a more disaggregated view, and think not about ‘sover-
eignty’ but about aspects or elements of sovereignty, it is clear that the 
states’ ‘sovereignty’ is very far from complete. In the cases mentioned 
above, it is no more than a shield against certain federal assaults on the 
states’ ‘dignity’ (another notion embraced by the Court in recent years). 
But there has to be more to it than that. The states have very broad leg-
islative powers, and most of these powers they do not get from the federal 
government or from the federal Constitution. From the perspective of fed-
eral constitutional law, the reason the states have these powers is that 
they just do. Because they are sovereign, it is tempting to say. When the 
Member States of the EU created the Union, they gave away some of their 
‘sovereignty’, and retained much of it. Similarly, when the then-existing 
states of the US created the US, they gave away considerably more of 
their sovereignty, but they nonetheless retained some of it.27 What they 
gave away, they may have given away more definitively, since they did 
it by acts of the people in each state (through ratification conventions) 
rather than by acts of the executive or legislature. Such, apparently, is 
the suggestion of the German constitutional court in the Lissabon-Urteil 
(where there was no act of the people);28 and such was the conclusion of 
the US Supreme Court in McCulloch v Maryland (where there was).29 But 
even if the states gave away a part of their sovereignty definitively, that 
does not mean that what they claimed to retain they really only received 
back by gift of the union.
If we compare the states of the US to the Member States of the EU, 
it seems clear that the Member States of the EU enjoy many more of the 
elements or aspects of sovereignty than the states of the US.  So we might 
think the EU Member States are overall ‘more sovereign’. But notice that 
both of the US judicial doctrines involving state sovereignty that I men-
tioned above are cases where the US states seem to be ‘more sovereign’ 
than the EU Member States. Congress cannot impose positive duties on 
state legislatures or on state executive officials. But that is precisely what 
the EU legislature does vis-à-vis Member States when it issues a direc-
tive. US states generally cannot be sued by individuals for money damag-
es (even under federal law) without their consent. Under Francovich,30 EU 
Member States can. This latter difference may not impress a European 
lawyer, who may be less inclined to see immunity from suit as an aspect 
27 I should note that it is controversial whether the states were ever sovereign at all.  This is 
denied by people who think the United States began in 1781 with the Articles of Confedera-
tion, or even earlier, perhaps with the first Continental Congress. But while the Articles of 
Confederation purport to create a ‘perpetual union’, they also specifically refer to the states’ 
sovereignty (in Article II).
28 Here I rely on Blockmans’ summary of the judgment (n 23) xv.
29 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
30 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
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of sovereignty in the first place. But if so, that merely emphasizes that we 
have no shared notion of what ‘sovereignty’ entails. There are other re-
spects as well in which the US states are arguably ‘more sovereign’ than 
the EU Member States. The US Constitution contains no provision that 
would authorize even temporarily depriving a state of its representation 
in Congress, as article 7 of the Treaty on European Union does.31 And al-
though the case has not arisen, I assume that the ‘equal footing’ doctrine 
in US constitutional law, under which new states enter the Union with 
the same juridical status as the existing states, would forbid the sort of 
‘post-accession conditionality’ that was part of Croatia’s accession agree-
ment.
We might also note briefly the issue of secession. Blockmans says 
that article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union prevents the EU from 
being regarded as a federal state, because it grants Member States a right 
of voluntary withdrawal.32 In the US, we fought a Civil War over the is-
sue of secession, and it was decided, not by logic but by military might, 
that secession was not possible. The US is a federal state. But Canada 
is also a federal state, according to the Canadian Supreme Court.33 And 
yet that same Court has told us that Quebec has something like a right 
to withdraw from Canada, a right that is not so very different from the 
right article 50 gives the UK to withdraw from the EU.34 The Canadian 
Supreme Court said that a decision by the people of Quebec to secede 
would impose on the other provinces a duty to negotiate over the issue of 
separation, giving due respect to the expressed wish of the Quebecois. Of 
course, Quebec would also have a duty to negotiate, giving due respect to 
the interests of the rest of Canada. Quebec cannot insist unilaterally on 
secession on its own terms. But neither can the rest of Canada peremp-
torily deny Quebec’s right. As to what happens if negotiations are incon-
clusive, the Court declined to speculate. Similarly, under article 50, the 
UK, by its unilateral decision, can impose on the rest of the EU a duty to 
‘negotiate and conclude’ an agreement on separation terms. Article 50(1) 
and (3) arguably indicate more clearly than the Canadian Supreme Court 
that the party that wants to withdraw from the union must eventually 
31 The Constitution does provide for the non-seating or expulsion of individual members of 
Congress, which would temporarily deprive a state of a representative, but those are ad ho-
minem decisions, not measures aimed at the state.  A stronger objection to my claim in the 
text might be that Congress made ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
a condition for some states’ regaining their representation in Congress after the Civil War. 
But the Constitution provided no basis for what Congress did. Those were special times, 
and a great many things were done that the Constitution did not provide for.
32 Blockmans (n 23) xviii. In what follows, I may submerge a distinction Blockmans draws 
in his footnote 39 between ‘voluntary withdrawal’ and ‘unilateral secession’.  But if so, 
Blockmans seems to do the same in his text.
33 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para 55.
34 See generally ibid, paras 90-97.
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end up outside, unless it changes its mind. And this now seems to be 
the common assumption about the EU. But there is some tension even 
in article 50 between the statement that the Union ‘shall’ conclude an 
agreement with the withdrawing State and the seeming provision in 50(3) 
for what happens if no agreement is reached. And on the other hand, the 
Canadian Supreme Court never says, or even implies, that the rest of 
Canada can force Quebec to remain. 
Where does all this leave us? For one thing, it reminds us that the 
EU is not alone in presenting puzzles for any attempt to shoehorn all 
‘federal-ish’ systems into a small number of well-defined categories. And 
that in turn suggests that instead of trying to reason from the categories, 
we should concentrate on trying to understand the specific genius of the 
system we are reasoning within. I assume that is one of the things the 
Court was saying in Van Gend en Loos.35 To some, this discussion will 
also suggest that terms like ‘federal state’ and ‘sovereignty’ have only a 
meretricious rhetorical force, but no analytic content, and that we should 
root them out from our vocabulary. I would not go that far. These terms 
would not retain any rhetorical force if they did not suggest to many 
people some analytic content, however dimly grasped. But we need to 
treat them circumspectly, recognizing that there are many aspects and 
elements of ‘federal’-ness, and ‘state’-ness, and ‘sovereignty’, and that 
different combinations of elements under each concept cannot even be 
put in a complete ordering of ‘more’ and ‘less’. That does not make the 
terms useless. We all now accept the ‘bundle of sticks’ view of property 
rights. But we have not abandoned the word ‘property’, nor should we. 
Even a bundle of sticks may deserve a name, to distinguish it from other 
bundles.
Envoi
In conclusion, I repeat that I do not offer these remarks as serious 
analysis of EU law, nor as serious comparative law.  Sometimes mere 
juxtaposition can be of interest, as I hope this has been.
 
35 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
